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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model of repeated innovation with knowledge spillovers. The
model' s novel feature is that firms compete on two dimensions: 1) product quality or cost, where
one firm's innovation ultimately spills over to other finns; and 2) distribution costs, where there
are no spillovers across firms and where incumbent firms' existing customer bases give them a
competitive advantage over would-be entrants.Customer bases have two important
consequences: 1) they can in some circumstances dramatically reduce the long-nm average level
of innovation; 2) they lead to endogenous bunching, or waves, in innovative activity.
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and NBER1. Introduction
Recent work in the literature on innovation and growthhasemphasized the process that
Schumpeter(1942) labeled "creative destruction.In the models of Aghion and Howitt (1992),
Grossman and Helpman (l991a, l991b), Segerstrom (1991), Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos
(1990), and Caballero and Jaffee (1993), new, higher-quality products are introduced by new
firms, thereby displacing incumbent firms. The introduction of these new products in turn sets
the stage for yet another round of innovation, entry, and displacement, because of the existence
of knowledge spillovers--once a new product is introduced, future generations of innovators can
learn from it and improve upon it.
The image that comes through in these papers is of a very fluid corporate sector, with
new companies continually pushing aside e,dsting ones. Indeed, this fluidity is seen as an
essential element in the growth process: it is only through the destruction of existing firms'
market shares and profits that new, better products--and the embedded knowledge that
accompanies them--come into being.
Yet casual empiricism suggests that the corporate landscape may be much less fluid than
these models envision. Many companies maintain their market shares in given product areasfor
a very long time. Often they manage to do so even as the technologicalenvironment in which
they operate changes dramatically, and the nature of the products theysell change along with
It.
There are two broad reasons why established firms might be expected to survivein a
rapidly changing environment. First, and most simply, establishedfirms may just have a
comparative advantage in innovation. This would imply that establishedfirms naturally tend to
1stay "on the cutting edge" of new products andnewtechnology, since they actually pioneer the
majority of improvements.Ifthis is the case, the survival of such firms would be no surprise—
they survive because they are either the highest quality, or most efficient producers at any point
in time.'
A second possibility is that established firms are nt always on the cutting edge of new
products and technology, but rather, they have a number of QShr competitive weapons at their
disposal that allow them to fend off more innovative newcomers and to thereby forestall the
process of creative destruction. For example, long-established firms are likely to have a base
of loyal customers and well-developed distribution networks that allow them to market their
products more efficiently. Or they may have long-standing relationships with capital suppliers
that allow them to finance their plant and inventories more cheaply. In either case, the net result
is that the established firms may be able to compete successfully against newcomers, even if the
newcomers bring with them substantial technological improvements.
The latter explanation of corporate survival in the face of outside product innovation—
which I will call the "customer base" story--fits well with the literature on competitive strategy
(e.g., Porter, 1980). Work in this area repeatedly emphasizes that innovative, high-quality
'Theliteraturehas identified a number of factors that may help to foster innovation inside
already-established firms. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) argue that incumbentsarelikely to have
a greater strategic incentive to invest in innovative activity than potential entrants when the
innovations in question are incremental in nature. Moreover, large established firms may have
certain organizational advantages in doing incremental innovation, as stressed by Schumpeter
(1942) -- e.g., preferential access to information or trained scientific personnel. Combining
these strategic and organizational arguments, Henderson (1993) concludes that: "established
firms are likely to dominate incremental innovation, while entrants are likely to dominate radical
innovation" (p. 252). Thus if most innovation proceeds at an incremental pace, one might
expect that established firms would naturally be able to stay on the cutting edge.
2products arebutone route to"competitiveadvantage", and that loyal customers and a strong
distribution network can also be cruciallinksin the "value ehaiif. The customer base story also
seemsto jibe with how some managers of established firms describe their own competitive
strengths. For example, FrankPerna, CEO ofMagma Tek,a$1.3 billion manufacturerof
electrical equipment, argues that: "I think the core competence of our company is really its
distribution channels--far more so than its Droducts." (emphasis added)2
This paper takes the customer-base story of corporate survival as a starting point, and
investigatesits implications for the dynamics of innovation. Thatis, I adopt an entrepreneurial
slant, taking itasgjy that manygoodideasfor product improvement arenaturallygenerated
outsidethe established firm sector.3 I then ask: if established firms have a countervailing
advantage over newcomers in the form of an existing customer base, how is innovative activity
bythesenewcomers affected?
Morespecifically, I construct a dynamic model with the following features: 1) incumbent
firms' customer bases give them a "distribution cost" advantage over potential entrants, an
advantage which gets more pronounced the longer the incumbents are able tosurvive; 2)
potential entrants on the other hand, may have access to a new superior productiontechnology;
3) technological innovations have spillovers—once an entrant develops a new technologyand
introduces its product to the marketplace, future generations of innovators can learn from it,and
improve upon it. The model has implications for how customer basesaffect both the long-run
2This quote is taken from "Continental Bank Roundtable on Global Competitionin the
'90's", Journal of Anolied Cornorate Finance, Spring 1993 (p. 40).
3As the references in footnote I suggest, this entrepreneurial premise may be mostrelevant
when the ideas in question represent radical, rather than incremental innovations.
3avenge level of innovative activity, as well as the temporal pattern of innovation.
In its focus on the long-mn avenge level of innovation, the model is similar in spiritto
the recent work in the growth literature that also analyzes repeated innovations with
intertemporal knowledge spillovers.4 A common theme of this work is that, due to the
illovers, the resources devoted to innovation, and hence the rate of growth of the economy,
can in some circumstances be less than socially optimal. That basic under-innovation effect is
at work in this model too, although it can be dramatically amplified by the presence of customer
bases. Loosely speaking, in my model firms compete on two dimensions: a Thigh spillove?
dimension—i.e., product quality or cost, where one firm's innovation is ultimately passed on to
other firms--and a "zero spillover" dimension--distribution costs, where an incumbent's
advantage never spills over to other firms. In some circumstances, an incumbent can survive
a very long time (or even forever) by being strong in the zero spillover dimension. While this
is privately optimal for the incumbent, it can be very costly for society, as generation after
generation of potentially high-spillover innovators are warded off.
Where the model departs more sharply from the papers mentioned above is in its
emphasis on the timing of innovation. Most of these other works have the feature that
innovation proceeds at a steady rate.5 To takejust one example, in Aghion and Howitt (1992)--
which apart from the customer bases resembles this model quite closely--there always exists a
41n addition to the papers cited above, see also Romer (1990).
'See, however, Shleifer (1986) for a model where innovations are implemented in bunches.
The mechanism in Shleifer's model is quite different from that emphasized here—bunching is
driven by aggregate demand spillovers that lead all firms to coordinate their implementation in
periods when demand is high. In contrast, demand plays absolutely no role in my model;
everything is driven by the relative competitive strengths of the rival firms.
4steady-state equilibrium in which innovative activity is constant over time. In contrast, a central
feature of the model in this paper is that when a new firm successfully displaces anincumbent
inany given period, this has a positive externality on future generations of potential entrants—it
makesit easierfor them to gain access to the market. This externality, whichIcall the
WshakeupI•externality,arises because whena new firmsucceeds, it breaks the incumbent's
strangleholdon the customer base. Thusthemarket isnow "upforgrabs", whichtiltsthe
playingfield moretoward technologically strong newcomers, andawayfrom established firms.
Theconsequence of thisshakeup externalityis that even if the underlying research and
developmenttechnology is stable over time, innovations will tend to occur in waves.Thatis,
if thereisaninnovation today,the odds ofanotherinnovationtomorrow maybe substantially
higher. Thus on the one hand, theremaybe long periodsofstagnation, in which no newcomers
enterthemarket. But these periodsof stagnationcan suddenly give wayto rapid bursts of
innovative activity.This wave-like aspect of innovationwasalso stressed by Schumpeter
(1936):
"...newcombinations are not, as one wouldexpectaccordingtogeneral principles of
probability,evenly distributed through time...butappear,if atall,discontinuously
in groups or swarms....Whydo entrepreneurs appear, not continuously, that is
singly in every appropriatelychoseninterval,butinclusters?Exclusively
becausetheappearanceofoneor afew entrepreneurs facilitatestheappearance
ofothers, andthesethe appearanceofmore, in ever-increasing numbers." (pp.
223, 228)
Asthis passage indicates,Schumpeter alsobelievedthattheentryof any oneentrepreneur
imparted a positive externalitytofuturewould-be entrepreneurs,and that this wasthe sourceof
waves, orswarms, in innovativeactivity.However,hewas somewhat less clear as to exactly
what thesourcesofthis externalitywere.Onemajorcontribution of thispaper lies in
5delineating more precisely the mechanismsthatgiveriseto this positive externality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is developed in
Section 2. For the purposes of this section, it is just assumed that inventions arrive exogenously
to potential entrants, who must then decide whether or not to spend the money to further develop
theseinventionsand enter into product market competition against incumbent firms. In Section
3, I extend the model to allow the probabilityofinvention to be an endogenousfunction ofthe
resourcesdevoted to research. As will be seen, this extensionfurtherstrengthens the positive
shakeup" externality effect, and leads to an even more pronounced bunching of innovative
activity.Section 4 discusses some further extensions of the basic framework, and Section 5
concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Types of Firms
The model is an infinite horizon one. In each period t, there is a single fincumbentN
firm, defined as the firm that was active in period t-l. With probability p, there is also a
"potential entrant" firm, that invents a superior new technology, and that may choose to further
develop the technology and challenge the incumbent for the market in period t. For the time
being, p is taken as exogenous; later it will be made an endogenous function of the resources
devoted to research.
If the potential entrant is successful in its challenge, it will become the new incumbent
in period t+ I. Only one firm is ever active in any given period--an incumbent always has 100%
market share. As will be seen, this feature emerges from the assumptions that are made below
6about firms' cost structures and the nature of product market competition.
In addition to Incumbents and potential entrants, there is a third class of firms, called
"copycats". As will be seen below, copycats are always strictly less efficient than incumbents.
Thus in equilibrium, they never capture any market share. Nonetheless, they play an important
thle: their costs serve to tie down market prices in periods when the incumbent firm is not
challenged by a potential entrant, and otherwise would be an uncontested monopolist.
2.l.AIncumbents'cost structures
Theincumbent,the potential entrant and the copycats allhavedifferentcost structures;
Ibegin by describingthat of the incumbent. The incumbenthasno fixed costs. Its marginal
costs are of two kinds: costs of 'production" and costs of'distribution". The marginalcostof
production foran incumbentattime t isdenotedby C1. For any given incumbent,production
costsdonotchangeover time. That is, ifthesamefirm isthe incumbent in periodst-1andt,
then C'1 = C1EI• Thusincumbents makenotechnological progress in termsoftheir production
costs6
The marginal cost of distribution for an incumbent at time t is denoted by D. The costs
of distribution are assumed to take the following form:
6The assumption that incumbents make no technological progress is obviously extreme and
unrealistic. However, it is made for expositional convenience only. It would be trivial to
extend the model to consider the case where incumbents make steady technological progress on
their own. In either case, the principal question would remain: when outsiders developbetter
technologies than incumbents, what is the likelihood that these better technologies are
implemented?
7= dC,' ff"forA,' ￿ A; (1)
dC,t for A,' > A
where$C1 and N is the 'age" of the incumbent at time t--that is, A represents the number
ofconsecutive periods (prior to t) over which the incumbent has been active.
Therearetwo things to note about the form of the incumbent's distribution costs in (1).
Thefirst is that theyare proportional tothe incumbent's production costs.Thisassumption is
not really critical for the basic point to be made. However,itmakes it possible to couch the
analysis in a steady-state equilibrium framework. Indeed, in order to facilitate the steady-state
approach, all costs incurred by any firm in the model will be proportional to that firm's
contemporaneous production costs. As will become clear shortly, this simplification allows one
to derive a set of time-invariant decision rules for firms--rules that do not depend on, for
example, a finn's current ratio of production costs to distribution costs.
The second, more important assumption embedded in (1) is that an incumbent firm's
distribution costs are a decreasing function of the length of time it has been an incumbent. In
particular, distribution costs decline geometrically over the first Aperiodsof incumbency and
then remain flat after that. While the specific functional form is not critical, it is crucial that
these costs do decline over some range. It is not enough simply to assume--as would be implied
by a switching cost model--that an incumbent has lower distribution costs than an entrant, but
that all incumbents have the same costs regardless of age. It must be the case that the loneer
an incumbent has been around, the stronger their competitive advantage along this dimension.
How should this assumption—that distribution costs decline with an incumbent finn's
Sage--be interpreted? One possibility is to think of falling distribution costs as reflecting the
accumulated knowledge about customers that is a byproduct of an ongoing firm-customer
relationship.' For example, the better a computer manufacturer knows it corporate customers,
the more efflcienuy it can market to them, customize the computers it sells them, provide
thntinuing service that meets their specific needs, etc.
At a general level, what is important about the distribution costs is that they represent
a competitive attribute where there is effectively the equivalent of learning-by-doing at the firm
level, but no soillovers across firms. As will become clear, it is this lack of spillovers across
firms that differentiates distribution costs from production costs in the model. When a new
production technology is pioneered by one firm, other firms are eventually able to learn from
it and improve upon it. In contrast, firms are unable to inherit the distribution cost advantages
created by their predecessors—if a new firm enters the market, it must effectively start from
scratch in building an efficient distribution system.
As this discussion suggests, the words "distribution cost? are really intended as a
metaphor for something much broader--any source of competitive advantage that tends to become
more pronounced with an incumbent firm's age and that does riot spill over to other firms. For
example, the work of Diamond (1989) implies that access to financing may be another important
competitive attribute which meets this description. In Diamond's model, the longer a firm
survives, the stronger is its "reputation" in the debt market, and the more efficiently it can raise
71n this sense, the value of long-term relationships is similar to that which has been
emphasized in the literature on banking. Bank relationships are valuable, this literature argues,
because of the accumulated knowledge about borrowers that they generate. See, e.g., Fama
(1985),Sharpe (1990), Rajan(1992), and Petersen and Rajan (1994), among others.
9external finance. Thuslong-established incumbents are likely to have a distinct edge over
newcomers inthis dimension.Tothe extentthat this financingadvantageallowsincumbents to,
say, carry inventoriesmorecheaply, they will have lower marginal costs of "distribution", in
the sense of the model.
2.l.B Potential entrants' cost structures
It is assumed that the potential entrant has invented a new technology, which if
"developed", will allow it to produce at lower cost than the incumbent. That is, the potential
entrant's post-development production costs in period t, C1, are given by:
= (2)
where X C 1 represents the magnitude of the innovation. X, is a random variable distributed
according to the time-invariant cumulative density function G(X)--the smaller is the realization
of X,, the more significant is the period-t innovation.
Although 1 use the terminology "production costs" throughout, the innovations need not
be literally thought of as only reducing costs. Equivalently, they can be thought of as allowing
the innovating firm to produce a higher quality product than the incumbent for the same cost;
this is the "quality ladder" interpretation adopted by Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and
Helpman (1991a, b) and others. All that really matters is that innovations lead to reductions in
quality-adjusted costs for the firms that develop them.
A critical feature of the production cost innovations is that they exhibit spillovers across
firms. In particular, if the potential entrant does indeed develop its innovation--i.e, it decides
10to go ahead with production in period t and takes over the market—others can learn about the
new technology, beginning in period t+ 1. This will allow future generations of innovators to
stand on the shoulders of the entrant, so that their innovations will further reduce costs from a
new base level of C.
Note that this assumption is already built into the notation: if a potential entrant decides
to go ahead with production in period t, it will become the incumbent at time t+l. Therefore
= Ct, if there is entry in period t. If another innovator enters in period t+ 1, that second
innovator will improve on the costs of the period t+l incumbent, so that C1 = X+1C1 =
X1X1C'. Thus if there are two consecutive rounds of innovation followed by development,
production costs willfallby a factor of XX1. More generally, if there are n rounds of
innovation and development in any given interval, production costs will fall by a factor equal
to the product of all the X's that were developed.
While the potential entrant has an edge over the incumbent in terms of production costs,
it is at a disadvantage in terms Of distribution costs. The potential entrant's distribution costs,
denoted by lYe, satisfy:
= dC1t (3)
The form of (3) is similar to that of (l)--distribution costs are proportional to production
costs for both incumbents and entrants--but the ratio of distribution costs to production costs is
higher for entrants.Essentially, an entrant has the same distribution costs that would be
associated with an "age zero" incumbent with the same production technology. Clearly, if
= 1, and the new entrant does not have any production-cost advantage, it will be strictly less
11efficient overall than the incumbent.
Inaddition to the marginalproductionand distribution costs, an entrant must pay a one-
time fixed development cost to begin production with the new technology. This development
cost can be thought of as the amount that must be spent to turn the research discovery into a
commercially viable technology. It is denoted P ,andsatisfies:
F1° ft (4)
Like the distribution costs, the development cost is proportional to the firm's cunent
production costs. As noted above, this is done to allow for a steady-state analysis of the model.
2. l.C Copycats' cost structures
In any period t, there is also a competitive fringe of copycat firms that can mimic the
production technology of the current incumbent. That is, a copycat's cost of production,
denoted by C, is given by:
= (5)
However,since the copycats have no existing customer base, their distribution cost,
is given by:
(6)
Since they use only existing production technology, copycat firms do not have to pay any
fixed development costs.Simply put, a copycat is like an incumbent, but without the
12distribution cost advantage.8 Thus its overall marginal costs are always strictly higher than
those of the current incumbent.
2.2 Product Market Comoetition
I now turn to the competition in the product market that determines both: 1) who will
control the market in any period t; and 2) the associated profits. To keep things simple, the
demand side of the market is modelled in such a way as to be essentially irrelevant. This is
accomplished by assuming that there are N consumers, each of whom wishes to purchase exactly
I/N units of the good, up to a reservation price of X. X, is sufficiently large that it always
exceeds the copycats' marginal costs, C + D',. This implies that prices and profits in the
model will be determined solely by the relative cost structures of the competing firms.
There are two cases to distinguish. In the first case, which occurs with probability
(l-p), there is no new invention in period t, and hence no potential entrant. In this case, the
incumbent competes against just the fringe of copycat firms. This implies that the incumbent,
by virtue of its lower marginal cost, captures the entire market, at a price equal to the copycats'
marginal cost, C + fl',. Thus the incumbent's profits in this case are given by
(C + D',) - (Ci, + D'J = dc(lsA:); where A1isdefined as min(A',,A).
In the second case, which occurs with probability p, there is a potential entrant in period
t.This case is a bit more complicated, and the timing of events is as follows. First, the
'The underlying assumption here is that the production technology does not have patent
protection, and hence can be cosuessly imitated after a one-period lag. Although this assumption
simplifies the analysis somewhat, it is of no significant consequence. Similar results would
follow if one were to grant incumbents patent protection and use another device to tie down
prices in those periods in which an incumbent is not challenged by a new entrant.
13potential entrant must decide whether or not to sink the development cost P1. If it does not,
then the incumbent is left alone with the copycats, and the outcome is exactly the same as
described just above. If,onthe other hand, the entrant does sink the development cost, then the
entrant and the incumbent compete a La Bertrand. The copycats will be irrelevant to the outcome
of this Bertrand competition, as their costs are now strictly higher than those of the other two
types of firms.
To simplify the nature of the Bertrand competition between the incumbent and the
potential entrant, I make the following strong assumption:
C -* D' C Ct' + D' for any A: and all t; or equivalently, (7)
< (1+d$A)/(1+d) for all t.
In words, (7) says that once development costs are sunk, the entrant's innovation is
sufficiently valuable that it always has lower overall marginal costs than an incumbent of any
The value of this assumption is established in the following lemma:
Lemma: lf(7) holds, then the Bertrand equilibrium always involves the potential entrant
gaining 100% market share and charging a price equal to the combined production and
distribution costs of the incumbent firm, C1 + D'1.
Without the assumption that (7) holds, things might be quite different, and substantially
more complicated. For example, suppose that A=5, and that there is a 3-period-old incumbent
who is currently at a cost disadvantage relative to the entrant--i.e., A, < (1 + dft3)/(l + d).
14However, suppose further that (7) is violated, such that X, > (1 + dfl4)/(1 + d). The
incumbentmightreason asfollows: "Suppose I pricebelow cost today, in an effort to hang onto
my customer base. Next period the potential entrant will surely still be around--ithasalready
sunk the development cost--but I will be in a stronger position, becausemydistribution costs
will have fallen as I have aged. Indeed,ifI can hang on until next period I will have lower
marginal costs than the entrant and will be able to earn a profit." Thus the incumbent might
engage in a complex intertemporal pricing strategy designed to trade offcunentprofits in order
to maintain its customer base.
However, if (7) holds, this sort of strategy is useless. No matter how long the incumbent
holds off the potential entrant, it will never have the lower costs. Thus there is no gain to the
incumbent from pricing below current cost, and it will never do so. At the same time, the
Bertrand equilibrium can also never involve a price higher than the incumbent's current cost,
for the usual reason--the incumbent would deviate to a lower price, capture the entire market,
and make a positive profit.
Thus (7) ensures that, once the development cost F', is sunk, the entrant will always take
over the market completely. However, it does not guarantee that the entrant will find it
worthwhile to spend the P, in the first place. For that to happen, it must be that expected
profits n1 of the development cost--denoted by i—exceed zero.
These profits can be broken into two components. First, there is the net profit (after
development cost) earned by the entrant in the period it enters--i.e., in period t. This can be
calculated directly from the results of the lemma as: C1 + D - C° -- F1' =
t [((1 + dfl)/XJ - I - d - f]
In addition to these immediate profits, a firm that enters in period t can also earn profits
15in later periods if there is no subsequent entry by later innovators, because then it only has to
contend with the weaker copycat firms. Of course, if subsequent entry by an innovating firm
does occur in some futureperiodt+k,the period-tentrant earns nothing from t+k onward.
We have already calculated the profits that a period-t entrant will earn in period t+1,
conditional on no entry by a new innovator at this time. This profit is simply that earned by a
1-period old firm competing only with copycats, or dC'(1 - fi).Similarly,the profits that a
period-t entrant will earn in period t+2, conditional on no entry by an innovator by this time,
are given by dCc1(1 - $2)
Thus overall, the expected present value of net profits to a potential entrant in period
is given by:
= cc([l+d$')/X -1-d-f]
+[(d—dfl)/(1+r)] (Prob of no entry at t+l)
+ E(d—d02)I(l.rf) • (Prob of no entry through t+2)
+ + [(d_dflA)/(l+rY) • (Prob of no entry through t+A)
+ [(d—dfr)/(l+r"] (Prob of no entrythrough t+A+1)}
where r is the per-period discount rate. The first term inside the curly brackets represents
profits earned immediately upon entry in period t; the second term represents expected profits
in period t+ 1, the third term represents expected profits in period t+2, etc.
2.3 Study-State Eouilibrium Development Rules
The appropriate equilibrium concept for this model is a set of equilibrium development
rules. In particular, for any given age of the incumbent firm A, we want to calculate a
"threshold" V(A) such that a potential entrant will choose to develop its invention if and only
if X1 c X"(AJ.Intuitively,in this equilibrium, a potential entrant will weigh both the magnitude
16of its own innovation, andtheage of the current incumbent, in making the development
decision. At the same time, it will take as given the set of equilibrium development rules when
it attempts to assess the likelihood of entry by future generations of innovators.
For example, if the potential entrant does decide to go forward in period t, the probability
thattherewill be another round of innovation a entry in period t+1 is given by: pG(V(1)).
Similarly,the probabilityofanotherround of innovation and entry in period t+2 (conditional
onthere being no entry in period t+ 1) is pG(V(2)).
One can re-write equation (8) in more compact form as:
Ct{[(l.daA)/X) —1—d—f] +PJTTJP..E} (8')
wherethe important new observation is that FUTURE depends on the equilibriumrules
V(l) )C(A), but is independent of the period-t data, \andA.Moreover,it is easy to
show that FUTURE is a monotonically decreasing function of each of the V's. This makes
intuitive sense: the greater is any X., the greater is the probability that a future innovator will
decide to enter, and hence the lower are the expected profits associated with entry today. This
is similar to the "creative destruction" effect noted by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and others.
The V's are determined by setting the appropriate variants of (8') equal to zero. For
example, Vu) satisfies:
[((1+dfi)IV(1)) -1 -(1 - 1] + FUTURE = 0 (9)
17Analogously, X'(2) satisfies:
[((1 +dfl2)/V(2)) -1-d-f]+ FUTURE= 0 (10)
Giventhat FUTUREisindependentofX1 and A,wecan useequations like(9) and(10)
to derive the following recursive relationship amongthe V's:
)C(A)/X'(l) = (l+dr); for altA ￿ A (11)
Inorder tosolve explicitly for the individual )C's, we need to pin down a "boundary
condition'--i.e.,we need to establish the value of, say V(l). While this is difficult to do in
closed form, it is easytoestablish the existence and uniqueness of a solution, and to do some
simple comparative statistics. From (9), X'(l) is determined by the following equality:
1+ d + f-(l+dft)IX'(1)= FUTURE - (9')
We have alreadyseen that theterm ontheright-handsideof (9'), FUTURE,is a
decreasing function of X'(l). It is also easy to see that the term on the left-hand side of (9') is
an increasing function of V(l). Thus the unique equilibrium value of V(l) will be determined
as in Figure 1. In the figure, the increasing function 1 + d + f -(1+dfl)/X"(1) is denoted by
"CURRENT", since this function representsthenet current (i.e., period t) losses associated with
entry when X =X"(l).Thus the equilibrium point has the simple interpretation of being that
18value of X, where the current costs of entry are just equal to the expected future profits.
Examole 1: In this example, the parameter values are chosen as follows: p = 1; ci =
1; f = 5;,8 =0.8;A=1O;andr=.10. Inaddifion,thedisthbutionG(X)isassumedtobe
uniform over the interval (0, .5).Itis easilycheckedthat this distribution satisfies the condition
in(7).
These parameters lead to a value of )J(1) =.268.From (11), it follows that the V's
then decline monotonically to a value of .165 for )C(l0). The probability of a developed
innovation when the incumbent is only one period old is .268 1.5 =.536.However, when the
incumbentis ten or moreperiods old, thisprobabilityfalls to.1651.5=.330.It is also possible
tocalculate the unconditional, steady-state probability of a developed innovation, which in this
exampleis equalto .491.
2.4 ImplicationsforthePace ofInnovation
One result that emerges immediately from Figure 1 has to do with the effect of
development costs on the pace of innovation:
Result 1: An increase in the ratio f of development costs to production costs reduces the
threshhold V's--thereby detethng the development of new innovations--but on less than a one-
for-one basis.
The impact Qfincreased developmentcostson innovationisdampened somewhatbecause
19there aretwo competing effects at work. On the one hand, an increase in I has a direct negative
impact on the profits earned by an entrant in the period these costs are paid—i.e.,inthe period
that entry occurs. This is manifested as an inward shift of the upwards-sloping CURRENT
curve in the figure. On the other hand, an increase in development costs raises the expected
profits that an entrant will earn in the periods entry,because it lowers the probability of
further rounds of entry by subsequent innovators. This is reflected in the fact that the
CURRENT curve shifts Jg the downwards-sloping FUTURE curve, rather than along a
horizontal line.
Examole 2: Maintain all the same parameter values as in Example I, but double f, from
5to10. V(l) falls from its previous value of .268w .161. Thus the probability of a developed
innovation when the incumbent is one period old falls from .536to.322. The unconditional
probability of a developed innovation falls from .491 to .269.
More central to this paper are the effects of customer bases on innovative activity. A
first natural question to ask is: as customer bases become relatively more important in inter-firm
competition, does the pace of innovation tend to accelerate or slow down? That is, does the
unconditional probability of a developed innovation rise or fall?
There are two ways to parametrize the importance of customer bases: either an increase
in d or a decrease in (3 can be thought of as raising the competitive advantage of incumbent firms
along this dimension. (In the extreme cases where either d =0or fi= 1,incumbents never
have any advantage.) Whichever measure is used, the following result obtains:
20Result 2: The effect of customerbasesonthe paceofinnovation is in general
ambiguous.In some cases, an increase in the importance of customer bases (i.e., an increase
in d, or a reduction in /3) can dramatically stifle innovation. However, there are other cases in
whichanincrease in the importance of customer bases can actually promote the development
of innovative new technologies. The latter outcome is more likely when p is close to zero.
The source of the ambiguity can be heuristically understood by reference to Figure 1.
For concreteness, consider the impact of an decrease in /3.Onthe one hand, this reduces the
current-period appeal of entry, thereby leading to an inward shift of the CURRENTcurve.At
the same time, once entry has occurred, a lower value of /3makesfuture profits higher in each
period in which the new entrant remains in control of the market. This causes an outward shift
of the FUTURE curve. The net effect of these two shifts on X'(l) cannot in general be signed.
However, the latter effect is more significant when p is low, because then new inventions arise
infrequently and it is more likely that the higher post-entry profits can be sustained for a longer
period of time. This is why customer bases are relatively more favorable to innovation when
p is close to zero.
On the one hand, strong customer bases create a type of entry barrier which can make
it initially very costly for a new innovating firm to enter a market. However, the flip side is
that if and when that firm does get established and has its own customer base, it will be able to
earn higher profits, because its competitive advantage over other firms (i.e., the copycats)will
be more pronounced.
21Examole 3: The potential for customer bases to have a negative impact on innovation can
be illustrated most starkly by considering a case where: 1) (1 +d)/(1 +d+ 9>)C(A)(thiscan
always be accomplishedby makingd and Alargeenough); 2) the distribution 0(X) is such that
X,alwayssatisfies X'(A)C\<(l+d)/(l+d+f);and3)p is strictly lessthan one.Inthis
case,the economy eventually must get "stuck" in a situation where the incumbent firm is at least
Aperiodsold, and where there are never any more new innovations developed. AU it takes to
get an incumbent to be this old is a run of Aconsecutiveperiods with no new inventions; with
p < 1, such a run will occur in finite time with probability one. And once the incumbent
reaches this age, there is no innovation that is of sufficient magnitude to displace it, since it is
always the case that X'(A)<X,.
In contrast, if we maintained the same 0(X), but set fi = 1, so that customer bases did
not matter, the economy could never get stuck in this way. Rather, every innovation that arose
would always be developed. This is guaranteed by the assumption that A C (1+d)/(1+d+O,
which makes entry immediately profitable against an incumbent with no distribution cost
advantage. The net result is a new developed innovation in a fraction p of the periods.
The observation that customer bases can be damaging to innovation may sound intuitive
and not all that surprising. However, recall that the words "customer base" are just a
euphemism for firm-specific learning-by-doing. So what the model is really saying is that th
potential for firni-soecific learnin-by-doin can actually be very harmful to innovation and
therefore to long-mn prowth. Phrased this way, the result sounds much more striking.
Examole 4: To see how customer bases can actually Jxlg foster innovation when p is
22low, consider a case where the parameter values are all the same as in Example 1, except that
p=10insteadof I.In thiscase,theunconditionalprobability of a developed innovation is
.064.
If, however, wetake these same parameters but set=1(keeping p =.10)the
unconditional probability falls somewhat, to .057.Thusthere is actually more innovation when
customer bases matter than when they do not.
While Examples 3 and 4 illustrate the potentially dramatic consequences of customer
bases for the long-run avenge level of innovation, perhaps the most novel aspect of themodel
has to do with its implications for the timing of innovations:
Result 3: Customer bases lead to an endogenous bunching* of innovative activity. In
particular, whenever there is an invention of sufficient merit to be developed in period t, this
raises the likelihood of further development in future periods.
This result follows from the recursive formula for the X's in equation (11), which states
that, the older is the current incumbent firm, the less attractive it is for a potential entrant to
develop a given invention. This observation in turn implies that when a potential entrant does
go forward in period t, this has a positive externality on future generations of potential entrants—
it raises their prospective returns to development, since they will be facing a younger incumbent,
on average. This positive externality might be termed a "shakeup" externality, since its essence
is that entry in period t breaks an existing incumbent's hold on customers, thereby shaking up
23the market and facilitating the entry of younger firms whose competitive advantage lies snorein
technological prowess and less in having an established customer base.
Example5: Maintainall thesameparameter values as in Example 1. Suppose there is
an incumbentfirminperiod t that is over Aperiods old,and that a potentialentrantis deciding
whetheror not to proceed with development.Letus askwhateffect the potential entrant's
decisionhasonthe probabilityofdevelopment in futureperiods, t+1,t+2, etc.
Ifthepotentialentrant does notdevelop itsinvention inperiodt,the new potentialentrant
in periodt+ I will still be facing an incumbent over Aperiodsold. Thus the probability of a
developed innovation in periodt+Iis pG(X(A)) =.330.In contrast, if the potential entrant
does proceed with developmentin periodt,the newpotential entrant in periodt+ 1will have
aneasier task, since it will be facing an incumbent only I period old. Thus the probability of
development inperiod t+l risestopG(X'(l)) = .536.
The potential entrant's decision in period texertsa similar, though less pronounced
influence, on theconditionalprobabilities for period t+2. If there is no development in period
t, the probability of development in period t+2 is given by: (1- pGQC(A)))(pGQC(A)))+
(pG(X'(AflXpG(X'(lD) =.398.If, on the other hand, there is development in period t,the
probability of development in period (+2 rises to: (1- pGQ'.(flfl(pGO"(2))) + (pG(X'(.l)))2=
.5 14.
More generally, given that there is development in period t,theconditional probabilities
of development in further-out periods decay slowly back to the unconditional value of .491. For
example, the conditional probability at t+3 is .504; at 1+4 it is .499, etc. Figure2 illustrates
24this time pathofconditional probabilities.
3.Endoenous Research Expenditures
Thus far, the probability p of an invention arriving in any given period has been taken
is exogenous. More realistically, this probability will be a function of the resources that
potential entrants devote to research activities. If this is the case, there is an additional channel
that leads to bunching of innovations: a shakeup of the market in period t not only makes it more
attractive to develop an existing invention in period t+ I, it also will encourage more research
in period t+l, and hence raise the likelihood of there being an invention in the first place.
To capture this idea in the simplest possible way, assume as before, that there is just one
potential entrant in each period. The potential entrant now begins the period by deciding how
much effort to expend on research. The probability that the research will be successful and yield
an invention in period t is then given by p(e.J, where e, is the level of research effort, and p()
is an increasing, concave function. Regardless of whether or not the research is successful,
research effort is costly to the potential entrant; in particular, the cost of an effort level ç is
given by R, which satisfies:
= ec1 (12)
As with all the other costs in the model, research costs are proportional to
contemporaneous production costs. The only slight twist is that the potential entrant's research
costs are proportional to the incumbent's current production costs.This simplifies the
interpretation, since one can think of the incumbent's production costs as already known at the
25time that the potential entrant begins research. '
In this extended version of the model, an equilibrium will consist of two sets of decision
rules. First, asbefore,there willbe the threshholdX"s, that tell us when development is
optimal as a function of the incumbent's age. Second, there will be a set of optimal research
levels,denotedby e(l) e(A),whichtell us how much research will be done as a function
of the incumbent's age.
In order to begin thinking about the properties of this equilibrium, let us begin by
focusing on equilibrium at the development stage. That is, take the research rules--the e"s— as
given, and solve for the V's. To do so, note that equation (8'), which describes an entrant's
profits fromdevelopment,is stillvalid. The onlydifference is that FUTURE is now a more
complicated function since it depends also on the &'s. It follows immediatelythat therecursive
equation(11) for theV's isexactlythesameas before. Inother words, oncewepindown
V(l),the ratiosofthe V's will be the sameas theywere earlier.
Thecomputation of the X(l)itself is slightly morecomplicated,butthelogic seenearlier
stillapplies exactly. That is, for anygivensetofe's, onecan stillshow that there is a unique
equilibrium valueofV(l) as in Figure 1. The only change isthatthe FUTUREcurvein this
figure, while still downwards sloping, may haveaslightly differentshape,due toits more
complicated functional form.
Having solvedfor the equilibriumdevelopmentrules, one can now foldbackwardsand
91ncontrast,it isa little more awkward toassume that theentrant'sresearch costs are
proportional to its production costs, since these wiltnot beknownuntilthe research is
completed. Nonetheless, using this alternativeassumptionwould have no effect on the results
below.
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Equation(14) makes it clear that, in any equilibrium, e'(A) must be a decreasing function
of A. This follows from the fact that both the integrand in (14), as well as the limit of
integration, V(A), are decreasing functions of A. Intuitively, the older the incumbent, the lower
is the marginal productivity of investment in research by a potential entrant. This is true for two
related reasons. First, development of any given invention is less profitable with an older
27incumbent. Second, fewer inventions are worth developing at all with an older incumbent. The
bottom line is that lessresearch is donewhen the incumbent is older.
This leads to the principal result of this section:
Result4:Endogenizing the level of research makes the bunching of innovations more
pronounced. In particular, the positive effect of an innovationinperiod t on the conditional
probability of innovation in period t+ 1 is stronger when research is endogenous.
The reasoning for this result is straightforward. The probability of a developed
innovation in period t+ 1 is p(e'(A',+j)G(V(A1+1)).Whenthere is an innovation in period t, this
has the effect of setting A'11=1. With endogenous research, this reduction in the age of the
incumbent has two distinct beneficial effects: it increases both the probability of an invention,
and the likelihood that the invention will subsequently be developed. In contrast, in the simpler
model of Section 2, only the latter effect was at work.
Examole 6:Maintain all the same parameter values as Example 1, except: the
probability p of an invention can be either 1 or .5, depending on the level of research effort.
Inanyperiodt, itcostsananiountequalto.2SC1to setp = 1;itiscostlesstosetp = .5.
It can be shown that these parameters lead to >J(1) = .28. Moreover, when A = 1, the
expected profits conditional on obtaining an invention in period t are equal to .5O5C. Thus it
is Oust barely) worth it to spend the money on research to raise the probability of an invention
from .5 to I. In contrast, when A'1 exceeds 1, it is never worth it to invest in research.
28We can now revisit the question asked in Example 5, namely how does development in
periodtaffect theconditional probability of development in period t+ 17 If we begin period
withan age-lUor older incumbentand thereisnodevelopment, the conditionalprobability for
t+us only .5GQC( 10)) = .17. In contrast,if there is development in period t, the conditional
probability for t+ 1 rises to GQC(1)) =.56.
4. Further Extensions
4.1 Gradual Displacement of Incumbents: Implications of the Theory for the Number
of Firms in an Industry
The current version of the model has the unrealistic feature that when a stronger entrant
arrives on the scene, it immediately and completely displaces the incumbent. Thus in
equilibrium, there is always just one firm with 100% market share active at any point in time.
While this feature makes it considerably easier to derive the sort of steady-state research and
development rules seen above, it is by no means central to the key economic intuition of the
paper, which is this: because of the shakeun externality, entry in neriod t+l is more attractive
when there has been entry in period t. This intuition survives in a more realistic setting in
which new entry at time t only partially displaces the existing incumbent.
The basic idea can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that we have the same set-up as
before, with one modification. Conditional on development, new entrants have lower marginal
costs than incumbents for low levels of production, but these marginal costs are increasing. That
is, new entrants have limited capacity and cannot immediately start producing cost-effectively
on the same scale as incumbents.
29Now suppose we startfroma situationwherethere is a single incumbentfirm thatis over
Aperiods old, and that has 100% market share. Imagine that a new entrant has an invention
of sufficient importance that it decides to proceed with development in period t. Because of
scale constraints, the new entrant takes over some of the market—say 25% of it—but not all of
it. Theincumbentretains its distribution cost advantage with the 75% of the market that it
continues to serve in period t. However, this advantage is erased for the 25% of themarketthat
switchesover to the new entrant, since the incumbent's ties to these customers have been
severed.
Next, suppose that another potential entrant arrives in period t+ 1. Entry will look more
attractive than it did in period t. Although 75% of the market is still being served by an "oId'
firm (more than A periods old) the other 25% is now being served by a firm that is only one
period old and therefore has less of a distribution cost advantage with its customers. Thus the
basiclogic setout above still holds--entry in period t still dislodges mncustomersfrom the
gripof oldincumbents, and therefore makes it easier for period t+ I entrants to attract these
customers.
Oneattractive feature of this version ofthemodel is that it yields implications for the
numberof firmsactiveinthe market at any point in time. In other words, because there is not
completeandimmediate displacement of incumbents, entry in any period t nowcorrespondsto
anincreasein the number of finns inthe market. Thus the model would nowpredictthat a
majorinnovationthat shakes up a market would typically be followed by a period of supra-
normalgrowthin the number offirmsactive in the market.
This sort ofpredictioncanbecompared to thestylizedfacts on industry evolution that
30emerge from the work of Gort andKlepper(1982) andKlepperandOraddy(1990). Thiswork
documentsa tendency for the number of firms in a typical industry to follow a distinctive, non-
monotonicpattern. In particular, Gort and Klepper (1982) identify five stages of industry
evolution, based on their study of 46 products:
"Stage I encompasses the interval in which the number
of producers in the market remains relatively small (usually
between one and three). Stage U is the interval from the "take-
off"pointof net entry to the time that net entry decelerates
drastically. Stage III is the ensuing period of low or zero net
entry, and Stage [V is the subsequent period of negative net entry.
Stage V represents the new equilibrium in the number of producers
that coincides with the maturity of the product market and
continues until some new fundamental disturbance generates a
change in market structure."
The arguments made above suggest that the notion of a shakeup externality can be especially
helpful in understanding the "take-off" phase of an industry—i.e., the phase during which the
industry makes the transition from the Stage I of no growth to the Stage II of rapid growth in
the number of producers. Think of Stage I as a time during which there is, in the language of
the model, a single incumbent more than Aperiodsold. During this time there is a relatively
low probability of entry. However, if and when an innovation large enough to prompt entry is
drawn from the G(X) distribution, the market will be shaken up and there will be a higher
incidence of further entry leading to a period of rapid growth in the number of active firms--this
31is the take-off phase)°
Itis also important to note that in the Gon and Klepper (1982) data, the rapid growth in
the number of firms that occurs in Stage U is accompanied by dramatic increases in productivity.
The mean duration of Stage H in their sample is 9.7 years. and the mean annual price decrease
over this time is 13%. In contrast, price decreases are significantly smaller in magnitude during
the later stages when there is reduced entry. These findings fit broadly with the primary
implications of the model, namely: 1) technological improvements in an industry will tend to
be bunched*, rather than occurring at a steady pace; and 2) these improvements will be
associated with the entry of new firms into the industry.
4.2 Marketable Innovations
Up to this point, it has been assumed that a newcomer with a developed innovation
always enters the market and displaces the incumbent. When this happens, the incumbent's
distribution cost advantage is not exploited. However, if the incumbent and the potential entrant
could somehow join forces, it would seem that their total joint surplus could be raised—i.e., by
'°Other recent papers have also advanced theoretical arguments that can rationalize some or
all of the Gort and Klepper (1982) findings. However, the story given here to explain the take-
off phase differs from those in other papers. For example, in Hopenhayn (1993), growth in the
number of firms is driven by exogenous growth in demand. And in Jovanovic and MacDonald
(1993) there is an exogenous change in the technological environment—an outside "invention'
--that makes it suddenly possible for firms to pursue innovative activity. In contrast with the
latter paper, in my model firms always have the ability to pursue innovation—it is just that they
are endoRenously more inclined to do so after a shakeup of the market makes innovation more
attractive.
32caking advantage of bQlii the newcomer's better technology and the incumbent's loyal customer
base,they could together make more profit than the newcomer could by itself.
One way that this could happen is if the incumbent were able to buy the innovation from
the potential entrant, and then sell it through its own existing distribution channels. Casual
observation suggests that such acquisition of new technologies by established firms happens with
some frequency. Of course, this is not to suggest that it is always possible for inventors to sell
or license their innovations. Clearly, there will be cases in which information or moral hazard
problems are so pronounced that it becomes infeasible to do so. Nonetheless, it does seem
worth at least considering the possibility that outside innovations will be acquired by
incumbent firms.
To do so in the simplest possible way, assume there are two types of innovations.
"Non-marketable" innovations, as before, simply cannot be transferred from one firm to the
other. Thus the only way that a non-marketable innovation can ever be introduced is by a new
entrant. in contrast, "marketable" innovations can, once they are developed by the potential
entrant, be transferred costlessly to the incumbent firm. The interpretation is that marketable
innovations are ones for which post-development information and agency problems are relatively
small, so that there are no significant frictions in having the original owner sell them.
The first observation to make about this extended version of the model is that marketable
innovations will, if developed, always be acquired and distributed by the incumbent firm. This
is just the Coase theorem at work--total profits are always higher when the incumbent's
distribution cost advantage is exploited. Therefore, the introduction of a marketable innovation
always leaves the incumbent in place. The immediate corollary is that only non-marketable
33innovations have the externality effect of "shakingup"themarket—i.e.,of displacing the older
incumbent firm.
This suggests that ifwe took the polar extreme where all innovations were marketable,
the model would be reduced back to something very similar to that in Aghion and Howitt
(1992). The age of the incumbent would cease to be a relevant state variable, as the incumbent
would always be greater than A periods old. In equilibrium, the probability of innovalion would
be constantfromone period to the next, and there would be no tendency for bunching of
innovations.
Given that marketable innovations have no shakeup externalities, the natural issue to
focus on in this setting is the externality effects associated with non-marketable innovations.
Now, we already know from above that a non-marketable innovation in period t has a positive
effectonfuture non-marketable innovations. But what is the effect of a non-marketable
innovation in period t ontheprobability of future marketable innovations?Inother words, if
a new entrant shakes up themarketbyenteringin period t, isitmore or less likely that
marketable innovations will occur in future periods?
The answer to this question depends crucially on the relative bargaining power of the
incumbent and the potential entrant when they negotiate the price at which the marketable
innovation will be transferred. The extreme case where the incumbent has all the bargaining
power is easiest to understand. In this case, the incumbent just has to compensate the potential
entrant for what it would earn were it to bring the innovation to market itself. Thus the potential
entrant earns exactly the same post-development profit it would were the innovation non-
marketable. Consequently, the potential entrant's optimal research and development strategies
34will be identical whether it is considering a marketable or a non-marketable innovation.
The bottom line is that if the incumbent has all the bargaining power, a shakeup of the
market in period t has exactly the same beneficial impact on marketableinnovations in period
t+ I as it does on non-marketable innovations. The intuition is simple. As before, a shakeup
of the market in period t leads to a younger incumbent in period t+ 1 and therefore makes entry
more attractive for a newcomer at this time. Even when the innovation in question is marketable
and the newcomer will not literally enter the fray, it is in a stronger position when negotiating
with a relatively young incumbent. Knowing this, the newcomer will be more willing to expend
resources on both research and development when the incumbent firm is younger.
A similar logic applies when the incumbent has "most0 but not all of the bargaining
power. However, when the potential entrant has a great deal of bargaining power, and is able
to capture most of the total surplus in the negotiating process, the results may be reversed. This
is because an older, more profitable incumbent has more to lose by being forced out of the
market. Thus if the entrant has a lot of bargaining power, it may be able to extract more from
an old incumbent than from a younger incumbent. In this case, a shakeup of the market in
period t would stimulate future non-marketable innovations, but might actually discourage (at
leastin relativeterms) future marketable innovations.
Figure3 summarizesthe discussion, illustratingthevery differentspilloverproperties of
marketable and non-marketable innovations. While both add to society'sstockof knowledge,
a marketable innovation in period t does not do anything to encourage innovation of any sort in
future periods, since it does not shake up the market. In contrast, we have just seen that a non-
marketable innovation in period t can stimulate future innovation of both types, particularly if
35incumbents have most of the bargaining power.Thusin such circumstances, it can be saidthat
non-marketableinnovationstend to impart larger positive externalities, all else equal.
5.Conclusions
Thepremise of this paper is a simple one: even in industries in which innovation and
knowledge spillovers are critically important, firms are unlikely to compete solely on the basis
of such innovation-driven variables as product quality or cost. Rather, they will also compete
in part on the basis of variables such as the strength of their respectivecustomerbases. With
customer bases there is the equivalent of learning-by-doing at the firm level,but thereare no
spillovers across firms.
Introducing customer bases into a dynamic model of repeated innovation significantly
alters the model's predictions. First, customer bases can in some circumstances dramatically
reduce the long-run avenge level of innovation. Or stated somewhat more generally, the
potential for firm-specific learning-by-doingcan,ironically, be quite hannful to long-run growth.
Second, customer bases tend to generate endogenous waves in innovative activity of the
sort described by Schumpeter (1936). The key to these waves is what! have termed a shakeup
externality. Whena newfirm successfully enters the market, it breaks the incumbent's
stranglehold on the customer base. This in turn makes it more attractive for the next generation
of innovators to enter.
The model developed above is extremely snipped-down and stylized. This was done so
as to illustrate the important consequences of customer bases in the simplest possible way.
Unfortunately, this simplicity also makes the model less empirically realistic, and thus less
36appropriate for directly confronting the data. One noteworthy deficiency of the model is the
very artificial industry structure in whichonly one firmat a time is ever active. Given that
some of the most interesting evidence regarding innovative industries (e.g., Gort and Kiepper
(1982), Klepper and Graddy (1990) centers on the number of firms present at any point in time,
this deficiency is particularly striking. Thus, if one is interested in generating a more
empirically relevant model, it seems that enriching the industry structure along the lines
discussed in Section 4.1 would be a useful first step.
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